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Abstract 
 
In our 2005 paper, Rethinking sustainable cities, we made a case for the increasing 
significance of climate change in the urban politics of sustainability. Taking a multilevel 
governance perspective, we argued that the ‘urban’ governance of climate protection was not 
confined to a local arena or to the actions of the state, but rather was orchestrated through the 
interrelations between global, national and local actors across state/non-state boundaries. In 
this paper, we revisit these arguments and examine their validity in the light of the rapidly 
changing landscape of urban responses to climate change and the growing academic literature 
in this field. We consider in turn: the ways in which climate change is shaping urban agendas; 
the utility of multilevel governance perspectives for understanding this phenomenon; and the 
extent to which we can identify a ‘new’ politics of urban climate change governance and its 
consequent implications for the development of theory and practice in this field. 
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Revisiting the urban politics of climate change 
 
Introduction  
During the 1990s, as the scientific community, national governments and international 
organisations began to negotiate their way through the set of debates that would become 
known as ‘climate change’, municipal authorities in Europe and North America also began to 
mobilise around these issues. In our 2005 paper, Rethinking sustainable cities: multilevel 
governance and the ‘urban’ politics of climate change, we reflected on this first wave of 
municipal responses and made a case for the increasing significance of climate change in the 
urban politics of sustainability. As part of this special issue celebrating the contributions that 
Environmental Politics has made over its twenty-one year history, we revisit this article and 
consider its salience in a world of urban climate governance that has changed rapidly in the 
intervening years. Far from being a little known concern amongst a minority of 
municipalities, the city now looms large on the international climate change agenda. For 
example, in 2010, the World Bank, for some a bastion of nation-state-focused development, 
declared that climate change was an ‘urgent agenda’ for the world’s cities (World Bank 
2010a). The significant contribution to overall levels of greenhouse gas emissions due to 
continued lock-in of urban development to high-carbon development paths together with the 
potential vulnerability of cities to the impacts of climate change has served over the past 
decade to bring the issue of how cities should and could respond to climate change to the 
forefront of many global organisations and has provoked renewed efforts at the urban scale to 
address these challenges.  
Revisiting our analysis of the urban politics of climate change, we first summarise the 
main points of our previous argument, which was based on the analysis of urban responses to 
climate change in the UK, US and Australia (Bulkeley and Betsill 2003), and focused on case 
studies of climate change and planning in the UK. We find that while some of the arguments 
retain their validity, a great deal has changed in the urban climate change landscape and thus 
there is much to reconsider. In this light, we examine in the rest of the paper the ways in 
which new developments such as the expansion of urban climate responses to a broader range 
of cities and a more strategic approach to municipal climate action challenge our original 
analysis and the multilevel governance perspective on which it was based. We conclude by 
considering the implications for the development of theory and practice in this field.  
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Reconsidering sustainable cities and the multilevel politics of climate change  
Our analysis of the emergence of climate change on urban research and policy agendas 
during the 1990s and early 2000s started from a curious paradox. While the discourse of 
sustainable cities had provoked significant interest in how cities might be implicated in, and 
respond to, global environmental issues, much of the analysis of how this took place was 
grounded in what Marvin and Guy (1997, p. 312) refer to as a ‘new localism’, a framework 
within which the ‘locale is seen as a socio-spatial container in which the sum of institutional, 
social and physical relations necessary to achieve a more sustainable future can be found’. 
This framing, we argued, was limiting our understanding of the ways in which wider social, 
economic and political processes serve to configure the possibilities of urban sustainability in 
general, and of climate change responses in particular. Seeking to ‘step beyond the local as a 
frame of reference’ (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005, p. 48), we proposed that perspectives being 
developed to understand processes of ‘multilevel governance’ could provide a useful means 
through which to understand ‘why moves towards urban sustainability are, and are not, taking 
place’ (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005, p. 48). As originally developed by Hooghe and Marks 
(2001) multilevel governance is seen as comprising two, related, sets of processes: Type I 
which involves the negotiation of authority and competencies between different levels of 
government; and Type II, where multiple overlapping and interconnected horizontal spheres 
of authority are involved in governing particular issues. Such an approach, we suggested, 
held out the promise of being able to take into account the multiple sites and processes 
through which urban responses to climate change were configured and contested.  
We focused on two cases in the UK: urban planning in Newcastle and transport 
planning in Cambridgeshire. In both cases we found that while issues of local institutional 
capacity and political conflicts were important in shaping the gap between the growing 
rhetoric of the need for sustainability and urban development realities, the most significant 
dynamics exceeded any purely local framing. We suggested, instead, that a multilevel 
governance approach could provide insights into the two key factors which determined the 
ways in which the rhetoric of climate protection was interpreted and implemented – the 
powers and competencies of local government, and the discursive struggles through which 
urban problems were defined. The Type I perspective helped us to analyse how, why, and 
with what effect, competencies for governing climate change were shared between different 
hierarchical levels of government, as well as to the disjuncture between the formal attribution 
of competency (e.g. to local authorities for the implementation of hard ‘demand management’ 
measures in transport planning) and the de facto sense of what it was, and was not, possible 
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to do at a local level (where, in Cambridgeshire, managing demand was regarded as a 
challenge that could not be undertaken in the context of continued economic growth). Our 
analysis found that it was the ways in which urban development and transport planning were 
framed and defined that was critical in determining how climate change was taken into 
account. Here, we found that ‘these discourses were constructed through coalitions of actors 
and institutions which stretch over multiple sites and scales’ (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005, p. 
57), including local authorities, dominant local business interests, labour unions, national 
policy-makers, and transnational corporations. In both cases, we found that these ‘spheres of 
authority’, which were constituted through sets of social, economic and political relations that 
cut across scales, served to sideline issues of climate protection and urban sustainability.  
This analysis led to two important conclusions. First, that the governing of climate 
change is not confined to arenas of international negotiation or national policy making, but is 
also a critical urban issue. Second, that the ‘geographical imaginary’ of environmental 
politics, where discrete local, national and international arenas operated in parallel, needed to 
give way to an account which recognised the complex vertical linkages between state 
institutions and the emergence of new political spaces which exceed this lexicon (see also 
Adger et al. 2003, Bulkeley 2005). Reflecting on our analysis and these conclusions after a 
decade of subsequent research in the field gives us the opportunity to consider their validity 
in the light of the rapidly changing landscape of urban responses to climate change. Here, we 
focus on three particular facets of the argument. First, we discuss the ways in which the urban 
climate change agenda has evolved over the past two decades and the consequent 
implications for how we should engage with the urban politics of climate change. Our paper 
was based on research which predominantly took place during the late 1990s, and the world 
of urban climate responses has shifted significantly since that time in ways that raise 
important challenges for our analysis. Second, we reconsider the utility of multilevel 
governance perspectives for understanding urban climate change responses. Reviewing 
different ways in which the concept has been deployed, we examine its shortcomings and 
future potential. Third, we consider the extent to which we can identify a ‘new’ politics of 
urban climate change governance and its consequent implications for the development of 
theory and practice in this field.  
 
The rise and rise of the urban climate change agenda   
Given the current ubiquity of narratives concerning climate change, whether that be with 
respect to vulnerability and resilience, or to forms of low carbon development and transition, 
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within urban arenas it is hard to imagine that just a short decade ago such agendas were far 
from common place. Although the rhetoric of sustainable development had taken hold on 
urban agendas in some cities by the late 1990s, few engaged with the more abstract issue of 
climate change. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the dynamics of the urban 
response to climate change can be considered in two phases. The first phase, which can be 
termed one of municipal voluntarism (Bulkeley 2013), involved predominately small and 
medium sized cities in North America and Europe and was characterised by individuals 
within municipal authorities recognising the potential significance of climate change and 
offering some form of response. The transnational municipal networks which dominated 
activity during this time – ICLEI’s Cities for Climate Protection programme, the Climate 
Alliance and Energie-cities (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004, Kern and Bulkeley 2009) -- were in 
this sense reminiscent of social movements with their focus on gathering intentions, 
knowledge and purpose towards common goals. Further, in seeking to respond to climate 
change, these networks and those pioneering cities with the resources and political will to do 
so sought to develop tactics that were based on an integrated, evidence-based, approach to 
climate planning and policy, and coincident with the broader direction of local governance 
within which accounting for performance was ever more important (Pierre and Peters 2000). 
The number of cities engaged with climate change grew through the 1990s and participation 
expanded to Asia, Australia, and Latin America. Reported actions were primarily focused on 
the reduction of GHG emissions from within municipal operations – a ‘self-governing’ 
approach (Bulkeley and Kern 2006), albeit one that has led to new mechanisms for financing 
projects, accounting for carbon, the deployment of novel technologies, and a growing 
political awareness about the issue of climate change (Allman et al. 2004, Betsill and 
Bulkeley 2007, Kousky and Schneider 2003, Schreurs 2008).  
In seeking to roll-out comprehensive approaches to addressing climate change across 
urban communities, municipal governments sought to ‘re-frame’ climate change as an issue 
through which other significant local agendas – air pollution, health, congestion, energy 
security and so on – might be addressed (Betsill 2001). Where action was forthcoming, 
lacking the political will and competencies to introduce new forms of regulation and having a 
minimal role in how critical infrastructure systems and utility services were provided, in the 
main, municipal governments sought to develop an enabling mode of governing through 
which business and communities were encouraged to act in, and on behalf of, the city 
(Bulkeley and Kern 2006). Taken together, the challenges of institutional capacity and of 
political economy that were encountered as authorities sought to engage in responding to 
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climate change beyond their own operations led to a more piecemeal and opportunistic 
approach than originally envisaged. While some cities were able to develop sufficient 
capacity and political will to overcome such barriers and to draw others together to sustain a 
programmatic approach to climate change in the city, many witnessed a growing gap between 
the rhetoric of a need for an urgent response and the realities of governing climate change on 
the ground.  
The emergence of a second phase of urban response to climate change came, in part, 
from the challenges encountered during this initial decade. By the early 2000s, municipal 
authorities and other urban actors were engaged in a more overtly political approach, one of 
strategic urbanism, in which climate change became integral to the pursuit of wider urban 
agendas (Hodson and Marvin 2010, While et al. 2010). While municipal voluntarism remains 
a dominant response to the climate change problem, especially amongst smaller cities, this 
new phase can be regarded as creating an additional form of climate politics. This political 
shift was notable in the US where the growing intransigence of the George W. Bush 
administration with regard to climate change led some progressive municipal governments to 
form the US Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (Gore and Robinson 2009). While it was 
in 2000 that the US Conference of Mayors first noted the significant role that mayors could 
take in addressing climate change, it was in 2005 that the Mayor of Seattle, Greg Nickels, 
challenged mayors across the US to take action on the issue (Gore and Robinson 2009, p. 
142). Following an initial agreement amongst ten of the leading US cities on climate change, 
a further call to action attracted over 180 mayors and by 2011 over 1000 mayors had signed 
up to the Climate Protection Agreement (Gore and Robinson 2009, p. 143). This approach of 
engaging locally elected politicians with the climate change agenda has been replicated 
globally, most recently with the launch in 2009 of the European Covenant of Mayors, which 
requires signatories to pledge to go beyond the EU target of reducing CO2 emissions by 20% 
by 2020 through the formation and implementation of a sustainable energy action plan 
(Covenant of Mayors 2011a) and in 2011 has more than two thousand members (Covenant of 
Mayors 2011b). In each case, members have sought to raise the profile of cities in national 
and international climate debates and to put pressure on national governments (especially the 
US) to take more robust action.  
This more overtly political stance is also evident in the engagement of global cities 
with the climate change agenda, primarily in the form of the C40 Cities Climate Leadership 
Group. This network was instigated by the then Mayor of London, Ken Livingston and his 
Deputy, Nicky Gavron, together with The Climate Group, a not-for-profit organization based 
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in London, and formed by 18 cities in 2005 as a parallel initiative to the Group of Eight (G8) 
Gleneagles summit on climate change. In 2007, this network entered into a partnership with 
the Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI) and expanded its membership to include 40 of the largest 
cities in the world (Ostrom 2010). Through such networks, and also on their own initiative, 
there is evidence that a broader range of private sector interests are becoming involved in 
urban climate governance. For example, the C40 network is collaborating with Microsoft to 
produce software for greenhouse gas emissions accounting at the city scale and HSBC’s 
Climate Change Partnership involves activities in five of its global centers – New York, 
London, Hong Kong, Mumbai and Shanghai. This phase of urban climate change response is 
characterised by new modes of governance. While enabling as a mode of governance is still 
central, it is also characterised by a growing reliance on different forms of ‘partnership’, or 
the blending of public and private authority, and a renewed interest in the ways in which both 
public and private actors might provide new forms of low carbon and resilient infrastructure 
in cities (Hodson and Marvin 2010, Coutard and Rutherford 2011, Hoffmann 2011). Together 
with the renewed expansion of the existing transnational climate networks, these new 
developments have been one of the factors that has led to a growing engagement with issues 
of climate change in cities in the Global South (Bulkeley et al. 2009, Aylett 2011, Hardoy 
and Romero Lankao 2011; Kiithia 2011). While these networks have continued to focus on 
climate mitigation, adaptation is increasingly on the urban agenda. Existing networks, most 
notably ICLEI, have begun to focus on climate adaptation and are seeking to engage cities 
through the concept of ‘resilience’, while the Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience 
Network, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, has been established precisely to promote 
urban responses to climate change which focus on this issue (Satterthwaite et al. 2008, 
Anguelovski and Carmin 2011, Solecki et al. 2011).   
The types of cities and responses to climate change that now characterise the urban 
climate governance landscape is therefore markedly different from those upon which our 
analysis was based in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In keeping with the municipal 
voluntarism that characterised the period of our analysis, we focused on the ways in which 
municipal authorities were seeking to use existing policy and planning processes to respond 
to climate change, and the emerging conflicts between environmental and economic interests 
that this provoked. As responding to climate change has in some cities become both a more 
strategic concern within urban authorities, and a more mainstream economic issue, the extent 
to which political conflicts would now be manifest in this way is open for debate, an issue to 
which we turn in more detail below. In addition, it raises fundamental issues about what 
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might be constituted as ‘urban’ environmental governance. For example, critical in reshaping 
this landscape has been the rise of carbon markets and carbon finance. For some cities, 
carbon markets are seen as a means of securing resources and advancing their local agendas 
and they are engaging in markets in many different ways (Betsill and Rabe 2009, While et al. 
2010). In mandatory emissions trading markets such as the EU ETS and the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the US, regulated entities are often located in urban sites 
providing the opportunity to finance local emissions reductions through the sale of permits. A 
number of municipalities were members of the Chicago Climate Exchange, a voluntary but 
legally binding emissions trading system which was in operation from 2000-2010. For some, 
the incentive was to gain experience on accounting for emissions reductions so that they 
would be positioned to take advantage of market opportunities down the road. A few cities 
have used the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism to finance emissions 
reduction activities. For example, Sao Paulo has a CDM registered landfill gas capture 
project that was financed by public and private partners, with the proceeds being split evenly 
between them and the public share being reinvested in social and environmental projects 
across the city (Puppim de Oliveira 2009, Setzer 2009). However, few CDM projects are of 
this nature and there are limited opportunities for projects in high priority areas such as 
building energy efficiency or transport while accessing the CDM requires existing capacity in 
accounting for emissions (World Bank 2010b). Few cities have directly implemented the 
principles of carbon markets within their own jurisdictions. For example, the City of Tokyo is 
the first city to implement an emissions trading scheme at the urban scale. While cities are 
not necessarily major players in global carbon markets, the presence of carbon markets does 
seem to be reshaping the ways in which cities think about climate action. The growing 
influence of carbon markets and carbon finance on urban climate governance lends further 
weight to our original argument that it is not possible to consider such processes as operating 
purely within a local sphere. Any such ‘localist’ framework would obscure not only direct 
lines of investment and influence, but the broader political economies of which urban 
responses are a part. At the same time, the emergence of carbon markets as one field within 
and through which municipal urban responses are being governed is one factor that raises 
additional questions as to whether ‘multilevel governance’ perspectives can sufficiently 
capture the processes at work, and it is to these reflections that we now turn.  
 
Multilevel explanations?  
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As outlined in brief above, our original analysis of the urban politics of climate change 
engaged the conceptual vocabulary of multilevel governance in order to understand the ways 
in which resources, competencies and power were distributed both ‘vertically’ between levels 
of government and ‘horizontally’ through other spheres of authority and the consequent 
effects on urban climate governance. While scholars working in the field of cities and climate 
change had previously identified these issues as critical in shaping local capacity to respond 
to the issue (Lambwright et al. 1996, Collier 1997, DeAngelo and Harvey 1998), engaging 
the concept of multilevel governance provided a coherent framework within which to analyse 
these issues and to point to the critical ways in which climate change is constituted as a 
political problem through this web of socio-spatial relations. Analysts have since deployed 
these concepts to good effect to assess the ways in which urban climate governance is shaped 
and contested. One important direction that this analysis has taken is to analyse the ways in 
which ‘network’ forms of governance are accomplished in the absence of formal processes of 
enforcement and of sanction. Here, analysis has focused on the opportunities that networks 
provide – for accessing resources, sharing knowledge, exhibiting political leadership, for 
example – that are critical in providing the incentives for municipalities to join and in 
sustaining networks over time. In Sweden, Mexico and South Africa, research has 
demonstrated the importance of access to climate change knowledge and to financial 
resources that networks provide, but highlighted the importance of the national and local 
institutional contexts within which such networks are operating in shaping their ability to 
achieve change on the ground (Granberg and Elander 2007, Holgate 2007, Romero Lankao 
2007).  
At the same time, however, research has pointed to the very different logics that can 
underpin urban transnational climate networks, from forms of technical leadership in the case  
of the Cities for Climate Protection programme which Toly (2008, p. 350–351) suggests 
serves to promote ‘neoliberal ecopolitical principles’ to forms of ‘norm entrepreneurship’ in 
the case of the International Solar Cities programme within which more ambitious and radical 
goals are expressed. There are therefore important differences in the types of politics being 
promoted through networked forms of urban climate change governance, which are also 
unevenly experienced within networks. Kern and Bulkeley (2009, p. 316) find that ‘in large 
networks like the Climate Alliance, the majority of the member cities are relatively passive. 
Membership in this case may be only symbolic’, creating an inner core of active cities that 
participate in the internal governance and strategic development of the network and a large 
periphery who may be only partially engaged by network discourses and practices. Writing in 
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reference to three such networks in Europe, they conclude that ‘networks are networks of 
pioneers for pioneers’, contributing to the uneven landscape of urban climate governance 
across the region (Kern and Bulkeley 2009, p. 329).    
In terms of ‘vertical’ or Type I forms of multilevel governance, scholars have 
examined the ways in which relations between local, regional and national state authorities 
have structured the scope for urban responses (e.g. Betsill and Bulkeley 2006, Romero 
Lankao 2007, Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009, Betsill and Rabe 2009, Puppim de Oliveira 2009, 
Gustavasson et al. 2019). This work demonstrates significant variation in the competencies 
and autonomy of municipal authorities between nation-states and, as we found in the cases of 
Newcastle and Cambridgeshire, across sectors(Bulkeley 2010; Monni and Raes 2008). 
However, despite the recognition of the importance of a degree of support for local action at 
higher levels of authority, evidence also shows that this is not a necessary condition for local 
action. In both the US and Australia, declarations of intent to address climate change grew 
most rapidly in the face of the reluctance of federal administrations to address the issue (Gore 
and Robinson 2009).  
For many analysts, therefore, the multilevel governance framework has provided a 
useful means through which to assess formal divisions of responsibility and resources, as well 
as to understand how ideas and norms are mobilised to create particular conceptions of the 
climate governance problem and the relevant scope of urban responses. Reflecting on this 
body of work as well as our own contribution, however, there are two critical issues which 
warrant further exploration. First, despite the avowed concern with multilevel governance, 
analysis of urban climate change responses has placed municipal authorities at the heart of 
the analysis. Given, as discussed above, the growing role of carbon markets and non-state 
actors in the urban governance of climate change, this raises a significant challenge. At the 
same time, authors have begun to suggest that it is in the very process of governing climate 
change that forms of multilevel governance – in terms of new sphere of authority and new 
roles for different levels of government – are being forged. In Sweden, for example, 
Gustavsson et al. (2009, p. 70) find that ‘climate networks and other networks are relatively 
self-governing, with collective actors challenging the territorially bounded, vertical, nature of 
central - local government relations’, so that they can be regarded not only as a reflection of 
the ‘rescaling of statehood’ but fundamental to that process. For While et al. (2010) the 
process by which climate change comes to matter within urban and regional agendas is more 
fundamental, reflecting a current phase of eco-state restructuring within which ‘carbon 
control’ takes centre stage. Such analyses pose significant challenges for those broadly based 
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within a multilevel governance framework within which, rather curiously, relations between 
different parts of the state and other spheres of authority, are regarded in rather static terms.  
Second, although the framework allows for an engagement with the multiple means 
through which climate change comes to be constructed or contested, in the main analysis has 
remained focused on the core policy areas within which climate change has come to be 
understood – for example, energy, transport, housing and waste. To date, there has been 
limited engagement with the ways in which, say, the activities of small and medium sized 
enterprises, the urban investment strategies of major companies and donors, or other 
processes that govern production and consumption, may serve to sustain, limit or contest 
urban climate responses. One example that has recently been highlighted is the limited extent 
to which studies of the multilevel governance of urban climate change responses has engaged 
with the dynamics of urban infrastructure systems (Monstadt 2009, Bulkeley et al. 2010). 
These ‘socio-technical’ systems are critical for they: 
 
structure a major part of the material metabolism in industrialized societies. They source, use, 
and transform huge amounts of natural resources. At the same time they are key catalysts of 
environmental problems like air, water, and soil pollution, and nuclear risks, and they make a 
major contribution to global warming’ (Monstadt 2009, p. 3).  
 
Scholars concerned with examining the role of urban infrastructure networks in shaping the 
contemporary urban condition have pointed to the ways in which related processes of 
liberalization, privatization, new technologies and regulatory ambitions have served to create 
a ‘splintered’ urban landscape across, in particular, cities in North America and Europe which 
used to be dominated by a universal model of service provision (Graham and Marvin 2001, 
Coutard and Rutherford 2010). The implications of such transformations, structured through 
processes of globalization, relations between financial markets and political authorities, and 
across different levels and sites of regulation and innovation, for urban responses to climate 
change have barely been articulated through the multilevel governance lens.  
Despite its role in extending the horizons through which we can consider the urban 
politics of climate change, the overtly ‘statist’ focus of many multilevel governance analyses 
and their continued concern with the direct means through which climate change is governed 
may serve to limit its utility. While national and regional institutional and political contexts 
will continue to shape what it is and is not possible to address in climate change terms 
locally, the increasing complexity and fragmentation of climate governance suggests that 
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there is a growing need to engage more critically with where the authority and capability for 
addressing climate change as an urban problem lie. Further, while in our analysis we sought 
to demonstrate how the ability to govern climate change in both Newcastle and 
Cambridgeshire was constituted through the bringing together of discourses and resources 
from across these different political arenas, curiously for many analysts it appears that the 
framework provides a means through which the taken for granted divisions between the local, 
national and international on the one hand, and the public and private, on the other, can be 
maintained. As suggested above, new work in this field fundamentally challenges this 
assumption, suggesting that climate change is an arena within which what it means to be the 
state, and indeed the non-state, is being configured and contested (Bulkeley and Schroeder 
2012).  
 
A new politics?  
As intimated above, the development of urban responses beyond the narrow confines of the 
municipality and municipally led policy and planning processes to include a range of actors, 
sites and processes through which climate change is being addressed serves to extend the 
political arena within which urban climate change responses need to be considered. In our 
original analysis, the boundaries of what might constitute urban climate politics were rather 
neatly drawn around municipalities and the protagonists on either side of a discursive and 
material battle to define and confine the climate change agenda. As the previous sections 
have made clear, the landscape of urban climate change responses now far exceeds these 
battle lines. In this sense, then, we can determine that there is a ‘new’ politics of climate 
change emerging in the urban arena, one which is no more ‘localist’ than its predecessor, but 
which requires an analysis which goes beyond the framework offered by multilevel 
governance in order to capture its complexity and its implications. This is a politics, as we 
have argued above, that takes multiple forms.  
On the one hand, the emergence of climate change as a strategic issue for a range of 
urban actors is leading, as we set out above, to what some have referred to as a politics of 
‘secure urbanism and resilient infrastructure’ (Hodson and Marvin 2010) and others describe 
as an era of ‘carbon control’ (While et al. 2010). Across a range of global cities, including for 
example London, New York, Los Angeles, Mexico City and Cape Town, new programmes 
for reducing greenhouse gas emissions have been accompanied by overt references to 
enhancing the security and independence of energy supply for cities and reducing the costs of 
energy for residents (Hodson and Marvin 2010, Bulkeley and Schroeder 2012). There are 
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multiple actors engaged in this form of urban climate politics. While the specifics vary from 
city to city, they range from large corporations in the financial, energy and property sectors, 
to non-profit organisations seeking to promote forms of energy security as a means of 
alleviating poverty, non-governmental organisations campaigning on climate change as one 
of a number of environmental concerns, and municipal officers and politicians from different 
departments, including environment, energy, transport and green space. Melbourne is one 
such city where, despite the fragmented nature of local governance in the greater 
metropolitan area, a co-ordinated and strategic approach to climate change has emerged over 
the past decade.
1
 The 2002 Victorian Greenhouse Strategy set out a range of measures to 
encourage the development and use of renewable energy and reduce demand for energy, 
including the development of energy efficiency standards for buildings so that new 
developments were required to attain a 5* rating from 2005, the promotion of GreenPower 
energy, support for the ICLEI Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) programme in regional and 
rural Australia, and the formation of regional partnerships between local governments to pool 
efforts and resources in addressing climate change. These partnerships were formed between 
a range of different councils, including those in the inner suburbs facing the challenges of 
economic decline and infrastructure pressure, and those on the suburban fringes where 
housing development is proceeding apace.  
One of the most successful of these partnerships has been the Northern Alliance for 
Greenhouse Action (NAGA)
2
, whose population comprises some 25% of the population of 
Victoria (NAGA 2008).  Initially formed as an informal network for sharing information and 
developing new projects amongst six of these pioneering authorities and the non-profit 
Moreland Energy Foundation, having completed the ‘milestones’ involved in the CCP 
programme, by the mid-2000s these municipalities, and in particular those who had adopted 
the CCP programme early on, began to develop more ambitious targets and innovative 
approaches. In 2002, the City of Melbourne adopted a target of reaching ‘zero net emissions’ 
by 2020, followed in 2007 by Moreland. On this basis, NAGA has recently developed a 
research project to ascertain the potential for achieving zero-net emissions across the region 
(NAGA 2008). Despite the recent recognition by the City of Melbourne in its Update of the 
2002 strategy that the target of reaching ‘zero net’ emissions will not be realized, the policy 
ambition to achieve significant cuts in greenhouse gas emissions has been reiterated and 
appears to be spreading across the NAGA region. Seeking to explain the foundations of this 
success, participants suggest that it is the strategic significance of demonstrating leadership in 
this area that is the primary driver behind their achievements:  
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We couldn’t show how much money we have saved in total through all of these things.  We 
probably can’t show, I’m probably being unfair but we probably couldn’t show how much it 
cost us either.  We know as an organization that what we’ve gained reputation … and we know 
that we are making Melbourne … a better place to be a competitive 21st century city 
(Interviewee, Melbourne, July 2008).  
 
In the case of the City of Melbourne, this leadership has been demonstrated through its recent 
membership of the C40 network. As the recent Zero Net Emissions by 2020 – Strategy 
Update states, there is ‘growing recognition that the City of Melbourne needs to align with 
other like-minded climate change cities’ globally (City of Melbourne 2008, p. 13). This 
involvement with an international coalition of cities not only provides access to information 
and resources, but also to the political kudos that arises as part of being part of a ‘club’ of 
global cities showing leadership on the issue of climate change. Such forms of leadership are 
not, however, without their challenges. A first issue identified by interviewees was the 
challenge of working within the framework of municipal governance, where ‘there’s only a 
certain amount of money that goes around; you still have to repair the roads and sweep the 
streets’ (Interviewee, Melbourne, July 2008) and questions are often raised as to whether 
municipalities should be leading on climate change issues. While climate change remains 
peripheral for many municipalities, as one interviewee suggested, ‘you’re constantly at risk of 
doing token changes’ (Interviewee, Melbourne, July 2008). A second challenge related to the 
conflict between environmental and economic agendas, an issue found to be particularly 
pressing at the urban fringe where imperatives for economic growth and development 
pressures are strong, and ‘where councils put up barriers to development … that extend 
beyond [minimum requirements] then pressure is brought to bear against … the case for 
environmental protection’ (Interviewee, Melbourne, July 2008). A final challenge concerned 
the feasibility and delivery of ambitious targets, and the need to avoid the creation of goals 
simply being conceived for political ends with little prospect of them being fulfilled. The 
dilemmas of setting realistic targets, managing expectations, and still seeming to ‘lead’ the 
field were evident in the discrepancy between some policy rhetoric concerning the 
importance of local action on climate change, the continued focus on internal emissions 
reductions for many councils, and the high and rising levels of emissions across the 
metropolitan area. As this analysis suggests, even as new forms of urban climate governance 
are emerging, many of the ‘old’ political issues remain.   
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Alternative understandings of how to secure and sustain urban communities are also 
emerging as cities seek to respond to climate change. Initiated in the UK and now to be found 
in cities in North America, Asia, and Australia, the Transition Towns movement is one such 
alternative (North 2009, Smith 2010). In common with the discourse of ‘secure urbanism’ 
regarded by Hodson and Marvin (2010) as characteristic of contemporary urban climate 
governance, Transition Towns seeks to promote self-sufficiency as a means of achieving both 
community resilience and a response to the twin challenges of peak oil and rising greenhouse 
gas emissions. In Transition Town Brixton (UK), sixteen different groups have been formed 
involving individual volunteers and some local associations, addressing issues including 
education, arts and culture, recycling and reusing materials, energy conservation, local food 
production, and the development of a local currency, the Brixton Pound. Here, rather than 
being concerned with the strategic dimensions of climate security and low carbon 
development for the city, in Brixton the Transition Towns group focuses on issues of 
individual and community resilience. For example, a ‘draught busting’ initiative seeks to 
engage with householders in draught proofing their homes in order to save energy, carbon 
and money, and also provide loans of smart meters so that householders can assess the 
effectiveness of their own efforts to reduce energy use (Transition Town Brixton 2011). Like 
other Transition Town initiatives, within Brixton there is a strong focus on the development 
of alternative sources of food within the community, including the development of 
community gardens, beekeeping, seed sharing, and planting ‘edible’ trees. Transition Towns 
do not, therefore, only provide an alternative set of possible interventions and actions in 
response to the ‘insecurity’ of climate change, but offer different visions for what sustainable 
and resilient urban futures might look like. Whilst some might suggest that such visions are 
hopelessly romantic, they serve as a reminder that the political consequences of addressing 
climate change in the city are not always tied into the continued domination of current 
patterns of political economy.  
There is also evidence that alternative discourses supporting urban responses to 
climate change are emerging in cities in the Global South. One such example is the Kuyasa 
project in the Khayelitsha area of Cape Town. Led by the NGO SouthSouthNorth, the project 
involved providing an energy upgrade to low income housing, including retrofitting ceilings, 
energy efficient light bulbs and solar-hot water heating, which together reduced energy use in 
households (hence yielding carbon savings) and energy poverty, providing direct financial 
benefits, as well as providing local employment opportunities. The Kuyasa initiative is 
particularly innovative because of its use of the Clean Development Mechanism, a financial 
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instrument agreed as part of the international Kyoto Protocol as a means through which 
countries in the North can finance projects in the global south which reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions (SouthSouthNorth 2011).  
While the emergence of  the discourses of ‘secure urbanism’ and ‘carbon control’  
posit low carbon urbanism not only as compatible with but as essential to existing patterns of 
economic growth (Hodson and Marvin 2010, While et al. 2010), these alternative forms of 
innovation challenge this dominant regime in two important ways. First, they seek to provide 
an alternative model of low carbon living, where forms of social and technical innovation are 
put to work to create new forms of economic and community relation. Second, they explicitly 
recognize that resource security is an essentially contested and unequal concept, with the 
result that vulnerability and resilience is highly differentiated within the city. Rather than 
witnessing the straightforward emergence of a homogenous and dominant regime for 
governing climate change in cities, the presence of these alternative forms of innovation 
points to a more fractured landscape, where strange bedfellows (e.g. international carbon 
finance and low income households in South Africa) are conjoined in developing new 
discourses of security and resilience, and where the potential for contestation and conflict is 
ever present. What this suggests is that urban climate politics is not automatically to be 
regarded as ‘a politics reduced to the administration and management of processes whose 
parameters are defined by consensual socio-scientific knowledges’ (Swyngedouw 2009, p. 
602). Instead, conflict, albeit sometimes latent and worked through everyday practices of 
resistance, contestation and the formation of the alternative, is emerging over what climate 
change should mean and for whom, and of the consequences for the future of cities. This is 
not to argue that such a politics is necessarily progressive, far from it, but it is to suggest that 
the extension of climate politics into new urban political arenas has disrupted the 
straightforward conflicts between economy and environmental protection that we found in 
our initial work in Newcastle and Cambridgeshire.  
 
Conclusions 
Revisiting our work on urban responses to climate change just a few years later, we are struck 
by how much has changed. As we articulate above, the emergence of a strategic urban 
response to climate change has entailed an engagement with a new set of urban places, 
politics and agendas that lay beyond the bounds of our analysis of ‘municipal’ responses. 
Critically, we can determine the growing influence of a range of non-state actors in shaping 
urban climate governance and an ever more complex political economy of climate change, 
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woven between notions of carbon control, resource scarcity, resilience and security. At the 
same time, forms of ‘municipal voluntarism’ persist, as a growing number of municipalities 
take up the climate change cause. Climate change, it seems, is now firmly regarded as an 
issue with which cities can legitimately be concerned, albeit that the levels of engagement 
and interest in this agenda vary significantly.  
Despite this sustained attention, and the apparent proliferation of interventions, 
projects and initiatives designed as part of this agenda, there remains uncertainty as to exactly 
what this activity might amount to. For some, the challenge remains one of accounting for the 
extent to which such policies and measures have made a material difference to levels of GHG 
emissions. Here, the rather unsatisfactory answer is that both at the level of individual cities 
and, perhaps more importantly, at an aggregate scale, we simply do not know. Municipal self-
reporting and individual projects have demonstrated significant emissions reductions and co-
benefits, but there remain challenges in accurately assessing the impact of particular policy 
measures against an ever moving background and of integrating assessments that have used 
different indicators, baseline and measurement tools (Bulkeley and Newell 2010). For others, 
the question is also one of the effect that the presence of climate change on urban agendas 
may have had in both more indirect and fundamental ways, in terms of shaping policy 
directions, determining courses of action that have and have not been taken, or effecting daily 
and mundane decisions concerning, for example, building management practices or the ways 
in which the road network is managed (Hoffmann 2011). As we found in our earlier work, 
understanding these dynamics requires both detailed fieldwork and an engagement with the 
political economies through which climate change is being conducted.   
Recognising the parallel development of municipal voluntarism and strategic 
urbanism, the uneven manner in which mitigation and adaptation agendas are unfolding in a 
diverse set of urban contexts, and the limitations of our current understanding of the effects 
and effectiveness of urban climate governance requires we suggest a renewed engagement 
with just what a multilevel governance of climate change entails. It seems clear to us that any 
understanding of the multilevel governance of such processes must therefore loosen further 
its ties to static and scale-based assumptions of how governance is achieved, and instead 
consider the processes through which the political spaces of urban climate politics come to be 
configured and contested. For some, this may require a more critical interrogation of the 
discursive and institutional terrains through which climate change comes to be an issue on 
urban agendas. For others, this may entail stepping outside the boundaries of such 
institutional accounts of politics to consider the ways in which climate politics are made and 
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maintained through the socio-technical networks that sustain urban life. Whichever paths are 
chosen, moving forward in this field requires, we suggest, attention to three core agendas. 
First, with the growing rhetoric and realisation of the ‘low carbon economy’, any 
understanding of urban climate governance must engage more closely with literatures on 
urban economies and their reconfiguration in the wake of the current period of economic 
restructuring. Second, as climate change becomes an ever more significant part of urban 
agendas there is a need to consider in detail the political economies and political ecologies of 
such processes, and in particular their implications for issues of social and environmental 
justice. Finally, we suggest that as more attention is devoted to the need for climate ‘smart’ 
and ‘resilient’ cities, we need to ask critical questions about the political work that such 
discourses and practices of governing the city are seeking to achieve. Collectively, these 
agendas suggest that we need a more thoroughly political analysis of the urban climate 
governance problematic, a challenge to which we are sure the Environmental Politics 
community can rise.  
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Notes 
1.   The case of Melbourne presented here draws extensively on Bulkeley and Schroeder 2009.  
2.   The members of NAGA include “the Cities of Banyule, Darebin, Hume, Manningham,                       
      Melbourne, Moreland, Whittlesea, Yarra, Nillumbik Shire Council and the Moreland Energy     
      Foundation Limited (MEFL)”, see: http://www.naga.org.au/ (accessed January 2013) 
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